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Jérôme François, Radu State and Olivier Festor
Introduction Malware for management Analytical model Results Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
2 Malware for management
3 Analytical model
4 Results
5 Conclusion
2 / 32
Introduction Malware for management Analytical model Results Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
2 Malware for management
3 Analytical model
4 Results
5 Conclusion
3 / 32
Introduction Malware for management Analytical model Results Conclusion
Network management challenges
I Increased number of devices to be managed
I Increased diversity of devices to be managed
I Not well delimited domains
I Multiple obstacles: addresses translators, firewall...
→ reach many hosts wherever there are
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Malware communication paradigms
I attackers faced the same problems
I control multiple machines through the Internet
I goals: distributed denial of service attacks, mass collecting
of sensitive data
I worm capabilities
I infection of multiple machines by various ways
I execution of a payload
I construction of a botnet
I control mechanism to send orders to the bots and get the
responses
I decentralized and scalable: example of 400 000 zombies in
one botnet
I bypass most of the security equipements due to the self
connection of zombies (outgoing connection)
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Botnet based network management
I use a botnet to perform management operations
I IRC (Internet Relay Chat) protocol: chatting
I decentralized architecture, spanning tree
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Botnet performances
I current knowledges: observation of malicious activities
I scalability proof needed
I main goal: send a management request to multiple
devices with the minimal delay
Addressed questions:
I what is the probability to reach 80% of the devices ?
I how much time is needed to perform the operations ?
I how many servers should be deployed ?
I what is the best topology ?
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Parameters
I consider only the servers
I N : total number of servers
I m is the maximal branching factor which is equal to
the maximal number of neighbors
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Parameters
I a server can crash if it has to maintain too many
connections → α(m) is the probability for a server to
be able to forward the messages, decreasing function
I the risk to be discovered by an attacker and to be
attacked: β
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Goal: determine the reachability = the number of servers
reached at a certain distance
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I a server can have between 0 and m neighbors
I the probability pk for a server to have k neighbors
pk =

1− α(m) when k = 0 (overloading)
α(m)
m
when 1 ≤ k ≤ m (random, uniform)
0 when k > m
13 / 32
Introduction Malware for management Analytical model Results Conclusion
The generating functions
For pk : G0(x) =
∑∞
k=0 pkx
k
I k = 0→ p0
I k = 1..m→ pkxk =
α(m)
m
xk
I k = m + 1...∞→ 0
I G0(x) = p0 +
α(m)
m
×
∑m
k=1 x
k
Useful function to compute the average number of
neighbors: E(k) =
dG0
dx
(1)
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The generating functions
I average number of servers at the jth hop1
z1 =
dG0
dx
(1) z2 =
d2G0
d2x
(1) zj =
[
z2
z1
]j−1
z1
1Ramachandran K. and Sikdar B.: Modeling malware propagation in gnutella
type peer-to-peer networks. Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2006
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Reachability
I number of reached servers at a maximal distance k
divided by the total number of servers
reachability(k) =
min(
∑k
j=1 zj ,N)
N
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Reachability
I one compromised server → all the network is
compromised
I (1− β)N = probability to have no compromised
servers
I the number of reached servers is limited by the
probability to have a functionning network
reachability(k) =
(1− β)N ×min(
∑k
j=1 zj ,N)
N
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Average reachability
I average reachability over all possible distance in a tree
avg reachability(k) =
∑N
k=1 reachability(k)
N
I random uniform connection of bots → same values
for bots
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The load of the system
I loads : load of a server to maintain connections with
other servers
I loadc : load of a server to deal with the connected
hosts
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The load of the system
I C devices in the system
I Cserver is the average number of bots per server.
I simple and centralized approach:
load servercentralized = C × loadc
I our solution:
load serverbotnet = Cserver × loadc + m × loads
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Average Reachability
I β = 0.01
I α(m) = e(3−m)
I N varies from 1 to 200
I m between 3 and 10
I tree = chain for m = 2
I small branching factor
→ better reachability →
α(m) impact
I using more than 20
servers is useless for
reachability
22 / 32
Introduction Malware for management Analytical model Results Conclusion
Absolute reachability
I goal: reach the
maximum number of
servers
I more than 100 servers is
totally ineficient
I 35 servers can be
reached in the best case
I 100 hosts per server → 3500 hosts
I loadcentralized = 3500× loadhost
I loadbotnet = 100× loadhost + m × loadserver
I botnet is more efficient if loadserver <
3400
m loadhost
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Reachability and the number of hops
I The number of hops
varies from 1 to 10
I N = 20 servers
I m ∈ 3, 5, 7, 10
I impact of α(m): high
connectivity and low N →
low reachability
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Reachability and the number of hops
I The number of hops
varies from 1 to 10
I N = 100 servers
I m ∈ 3, 5, 7, 10
I lowest reachability for m = 3
→ m has a greater impact than
α(m) due to the value of N
I m and α(m) are antagonist
I important curves to determine
the servers topology
I m = 5 is a good choice for a 20-100 servers network
I maximum reachability → 7 hops
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Reachability and the number of nodes
I distance = 5 hops I N varies from 1 to 100
I first stage limited by β,
second stage limited by
α(m)
I competitive impact of
α(m) and β → one
limitative factor at a
certain time
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Current solutions
I centralized solution
I decentralized solutions with mid-level managers
(requests translations, results aggregation)
I management by delegation
I active networks
I salutary worms: CodeRed / CodeGreen
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Advantages of IRC botnets for network
management
I the servers have just to forward the messages (light
software)
I the IRC clients for the devices do not need many
resources
I the devices have to connect themselves to the botnet
→ bypass active network equipments
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Topology and Scalability
Evaluation → help an administrator to choose the right
topology
I maximum number of servers: 100, 20 for the best
“profitability of servers”
I 100 servers → 35 reached servers (35%)
I 20 servers → 16 reached servers (81%)
I maximal distance: 7 hops
I best branching factor: m = 5
I 200 bots per servers → the same management
operation can be sent to 7000 devices simultaneously
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Future works
I implementation and deployment of the solution on a
large testbed (PlanetLab, EmanicsLab)
I case study: configure a large distributed honeypot for
detecting cyber predators on P2P file sharing systems
I study the other botnets communication mechanisms
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